THE JEWS SWALLOWED THE BITTER PILL OF HAVING TO ACCEPT A MINI-STATE,

The Israel-Palestine conflict has always been dominated by symbols, the legacy of the past and the everlasting desire to score PR points. So, today was one of those days to be remembered in the annals of the tragic conflict. A major success for Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority (PA), an embarrassment to PM Netanyahu and Israel, a potential problem to Hamas and altogether an event whose actual, continuing impact is yet to unfold.

First, the symbolic significance. It was today, 65 years ago, that the General Assembly decided to partition the disputed land of Israel/Palestine between the two protagonists. The Jews swallowed the bitter pill of having to accept a mini-state, just 3 years after the Holocaust in Europe, and without the eternal capital of the Jewish people, the Holy City of Jerusalem. To be sure, this was far from a unanimous decision, but a decision nevertheless. The Palestinian Arabs, backed by the member states of the Arab League, rejected the decision, and opened an all-out attack on the Jews, which led to their defeat in a matter of five months. Then came the invasion of five regular Arab Armies, threatening to put an end to the Jewish state established in compliance with the UN resolution. But the UN was being the UN, a theater of the absurd when dealing with Israel, so that day of November 29th was declared, years ago, an International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian people. Put in sum, a prize to the aggressors who violated the UN’s own resolution. So, here is the historic irony of all that.

As for current politics, Mahmoud Abbas is back, in full force and with a renewed sense of relevancy. His speech was not that of a statesman, not that of a leader who is gearing up towards peace negotiations. He never mentioned the name Israel even once, leaving “some” people, at least, to wonder if he has a problem of amnesia. But then, the speech was all about PR and why not. This was his and his people’s day, and Abbas talked to them first and foremost. Also PM Netanyahu speaks these days to his own people, as he is preparing for the upcoming general elections on January 22nd, and his dismissive reaction to the spectacle in New York should be seen in this context.

Netanyahu has some explanations to make to the Israeli public, particularly as regards the vote of some of Israel’s traditional allies, such as Germany, France, Italy and Britain, but his problems could be much bigger, if the U.S. abstained, or voted in favor. In Israeli politics, America is still THE STATE to look at. However, Netanyahu may not lose votes, as the Likud political/PR machine will skillfully turn the diplomatic debacle into a domestic political gain. Strange? Maybe, but welcome to Israeli politics and national mood, where to be isolated, or almost so, seem to be the normal state of affairs, a vindication of the long-held sentiment that “THEY are all against us”…

As for Hamas, they are not celebrating anymore the “victory” over Israel, something that belongs to the political folklore of the Palestinian people, which is the ability to turn military defeat to a psychological stimulant. Hamas has to deal now with its political reaction to Abbas’ diplomatic victory. Their initial move was very interesting, and somewhat encouraging. They allowed Fatah of Abbas to openly celebrate in Gaza a resolution based on the principle of two states, a principle vehemently rejected by them.

So, when the bells are no longer ringing, the propaganda is over, and domestic politics are taking second pedal, can we expect to witness a real, actual change in the situation? Any possible breakthrough in the moribund peace process? In order to turn this day into a real historic day, some meaningful progress in that process should take place so that in the near future, the Palestinians will really be able to say that it was in November 29th that they finally accepted the famous resolution from November 29th, 1947.

Abbas and his people will have to understand that the realization of their aspirations require talks with Israel. Netanyahu, most likely Israel’s next PM, should overcome his own right-wing potential rebels and the parties to his right, and make it easier, MUCH easier for Abbas. Today, Netanyahu saw the yellow card, soon after January 22nd he could see the red card. Hamas will have to play its role as well — either stand on the sidelines when Abbas gets back to the negotiating table while maintaining the cease-fire with Israel, or, what will be even more significant, mend fences with Abbas and accepting his superiority.

A catalog list which by all accounts will be almost impossible to fulfill, but the attempt has to be made, so that in the near future, Palestinians and Israelis will be happy simultaneously.

Since we do not live in the best of all possible worlds, and since Americans persist in believing that they are the “indispensable” nation, other states will need to make clear to the United States that its vote on the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People has definitively disqualified it not only from its prior monopoly control over the “Middle East peace process” but even from any further role in it and that its further involvement in the preeminent moral issue facing the international community is no longer needed or wanted.

Here in Washington, negative reactions to the United Nations’ vote to admit Palestine as a non-member state have ranged from silly and infuriating to downright dangerous. The hysteria surrounding this UN vote may seem strange, even bizarre, to outsiders, but here in Washington it was expected.

The rhetoric was harsh and the actions proposed by lawmakers were extreme and, if passed, could prove dangerous. But why all the panic? Instead of simply shrugging off their responses as “business as usual,” it is useful to examine the unspoken assumptions that underlie these reactions.

Here’s one example: the “news crawl” running on one of the networks during the UN debate read “U.S. aid threatened by UN vote,” as if the statement were logical and complete in itself, requiring no further explanation. Unstated, but taken as a “given,” was the connection between the “aid” and the “vote,” and that is the hold that pro-Israeli hardliners have over appropriations in the U.S. Congress.

As if to make this point, in the days and hours leading up to the vote, several U.S. Senators leapt into the fray. First on board were a group of Republicans who offered an amendmentto the National Defense Authorization Act that would not only cut U.S. aid to the Palestinian Authority (PA) by 50 percent should they seek to change their status at the U.N., it would also cut by 20 percent U.S. assistance to any nation that voted for the Palestinian resolution. This measure is dangerous and could threaten U.S. relations with many important allies around the world. It is also silly and poorly drafted, since as our friends at Americans for Peace Now point out, it is not the PA that is moving to change their status at the UN. The PLO is the group that has brought the resolution to the international body. And the PLO is not a recipient of any U.S. aid. There is another Republican amendment that proposes to cut all U.S. support to the UN should that body vote to change the status of the Palestinians.

Finally, there is a bipartisan amendment that would ban U.S. aid to the Palestinians should they become involved in any action before the International Criminal Court. This is an obvious and ham-fisted attempt to shield Israel from any action by the Court. A second provision in the same amendment would order the closure of Washington’s PLO mission unless the president, on a regular basis, is able to certify to Congress that the Palestinians are engaged in “meaningful negotiations” with Israel, without ever defining what is meant by “meaningful.”

“Expert” commentators have also reacted to the UN vote, largely indulging in banal expressions of what has come to be accepted “conventional wisdom.” On the one hand, they have pointed out the obvious — that the “vote will change nothing on the ground” or that “peace will only come through negotiations.” They have also issued warnings against the Palestinians taking “unilateral actions,” cautioning that passage of the statehood measure would have “dire consequences,” “risk exacerbating tensions” with Israel, and “create an impediment to the peace process.” I am tempted to digress and ask “what about Israeli unilateral actions?” or “what peace process?” All these warnings take for granted the unstated but accepted assumption that any Israeli reaction to the vote must be seen a logical consequence of any Palestinian assertion of their rights.

The most infuriating comment came from the Israelis in reaction to the announcement that France and other European nations would vote for Palestine. This they lamented would deny Israel the support of what they termed “the moral majority” — by which they meant “white,” “Western” nations. The racism suggested in this formulation is so obvious and disturbing, and yet was reported without comment in The New York Times.

As all of this was playing out this week, my mind hearkened back 24 years ago, when working with the Jesse Jackson for President campaign I had the opportunity to lead the first ever debate on Palestinian rights at a political convention. In the lead up to the debate, the party leadership did everything they could to block our effort. I was warned “if you persist, you will destroy the Democratic Party” and “you will never have a place in this party again.” One prominent pro-Israel Democrat actually said “I’m scared. Nothing like this has ever happened before.”

Their hysteria and fear were real. But what troubled me most was that my opponents would never verbalize or admit the source of their panic and fear. It was, in my way of thinking, irrational. To them it was perfectly rational — but because it sounded so awful, they would never verbalize the reasons for their panic. Some were motivated by the crass political calculation that anything that demonstrated their less than total support, not for Israel, but for whatever the most hard-line pro-Israel voices wanted, would somehow compromise them, causing them to suffer unspoken harsh consequences. For others, it was an issue of power and control — as in, “how dare the Arabs assert themselves and demand equal treatment and the right to speak without first seeking our approval?”

This same “logic” played out at the UN this week, to the same effect. The world spoke, but the U.S. proved itself incapable not only of acting in concert with the world, but of admitting the reasons why it could not. All of this, sadly, makes clear the fact that when it comes to Israeli-Palestinian peace, the U.S. remains the critical player, but because of the constraints our deformed politics has imposed on this and past Administrations, Washington appears incapable of fulfilling that role.

And so the vote happened. The U.S. and Israel self-isolated. The Palestinians win, but nothing changes — because the U.S. has not yet changed or been able to break the hold of its still unacknowledged bonds.

The U.S. vote against raising the status of Palestine at the United Nations was a deeply cynical move. It was cynical because there is not a chance that President Obama believes that he did the right thing. It is also cynical because, in the name of friendship for Israel, Obama led Israel off the cliff.

The last thing a true friend of Israel would have supported is putting Israel in a situation where its almost complete international isolation was demonstrated. Eight countries backed the Israeli position — the U.S., Panama, Palau, Canada, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Czech Republic and Micronesia — while 138 voted with the Palestinians. Was this display helpful to Israel?

But Obama was not trying to be helpful. The administration enabled this disaster (from Israel’s point of view) because Obama seems to truly not care about Israelis or Palestinians.

Take the two most recent examples. The first was his absolute refusal to express a word of sympathy for the Palestinians killed in the Gaza war. Under previous administrations, certainly under every Democratic administration, sympathy was expressed for the dead and injured on both sides along with a call for an end to the fighting. But Obama would not do that. Even when asked directly, his spokesperson at the State Department would only speak of Israel’s pain (to her credit, Secretary of State Clinton did say that she felt for both sides).

But not Obama. He is determined not only to demonstrate that there is “no daylight” separating the two countries but that no amount of darkness separates us either.

The argument that he has to behave this way because of the power of the lobby is ridiculous. I would be the last person in the world to deny that the lobby is a powerful force in the making of U.S. Middle East policy. But, unless there is some mysterious element to the lobby’s power that I am missing, its ability to intimidate ends when a president is re-elected.

Believing that Obama is worried about Congressional Democrats being punished in 2014 is just silly. One, that is two years away. Two, Obama has never (like almost all presidents) demonstrated much concern for the Congressional wing of his party. And, three, the November 6th election demonstrated yet again that Jewish voters do not cast their ballots (or make campaign contributions) based on Israel. Nor do Israel’s fundamentalist Christian backers. Jews are overwhelmingly Democrats and Christian Zionists are conservative Republicans. Those facts seem never to change.

Besides, does Obama really believe that he would lose votes or campaign contributions from Jews and other pro-Israel Americans if he expressed sympathy for dead Palestinian children? Or called on both sides to stop the violence. I hold no brief for the lobby but Obama could have said what he no doubt felt without losing anyone’s support. Even the lobby does not demand that politicians withhold human sympathy.

As for the United Nations vote, Obama could have prevented the huge embarrassment inflicted on both Israel and the United States by telling Israel to “chill.” I am glad he didn’t because I think the vote will be seen by history as a significant step toward Palestinian statehood. But it also delegitimized Israel in the eyes of the world, which is a terrible defeat for those of us who care about Israel ultimately achieving peace and security alongside the Palestinians.

And it could easily have been averted if Obama had told Israel that the United States would vote for the resolution and that Israel should too. In that case, the vote for Palestine’s elevated status would have been unanimous which would have rendered the Palestinian victory meaningless. Unanimous backing for any measure almost always demonstrates the measure’s insignificance. Instead, Israel’s hysteria and America’s arm-twisting against the resolution gave the Palestinians a victory, a victory that the United States and Israel both elevated to historic proportions.

So why did Obama behave the way he did? I am afraid it is because he does not think Israelis or Palestinians are worth the hassle. If he can avoid dealing with Netanyahu and his vocal backers here, he will. He has more important fish to fry — like the domestic economy and preserving the social safety net.

I understand that but nonetheless ignoring the Israeli-Palestinian issue — by simply parroting the Israeli line — has done terrible damage to America’s standing in the world. Look at the UN vote, which was neatly summed up by the front-page New York Timesheadline: “UN Assembly, In Blow To U.S., Elevates Status of Palestine.” Perhaps it is of no concern of Obama’s that Israel appears utterly isolated, but so does the United States.

I will not conclude by expressing the hope that Obama will now do the right thing for Israel, Palestine and, most importantly, the United States by convening negotiations and acting as an “honest broker.”

I doubt he can do that anymore, both because he has entirely lost the trust of the Arab world and because events have demonstrated, in large part due to this administration, that history can move on without us. But primarily because I do not think President Obama cares enough to invest any time or energy in Middle East peacemaking.

He just seems not to care that resolving conflict in a vital region of the world is not just some favor we do for people 6,000 miles away; it is something we do to defend American interests. It’s sad. But above all, it is just cynical.